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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

vs.

Case No.

JESSE JUNIOR GILPIN,

11786

Defendant-AppeUant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NATURE OF THE CASE
The defendant, Jesse Junior Gilpin, is appealing from
a conviction of robbery in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
76-01-1 (1953).
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The defendant, Jesse Junior Gilpin, was found guilty
by a .i ury of the crime of robbery on March 4, 1969, and
was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term as prescribed by law.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent asks this Court to affirm the decision
of the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State of

2
Utah, and hold that no erron; were committed by th e t rial
·
court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent agrees with the facts as set out by appeJ.
lant but wishes to insert the following.
The appellant relied on the defense of alibi. He called
his aunt (T. 140), his cousins (T. 142, 148, 157), his close
friend (T. 150) and himself (T. 162) to testify that he
was at his aunt'.s home on September 27, 1968, between
7 :00 and 10 :00 p.m. Three 'Of the witnesses who testified
were not present at the home located at 263 West First
North and were not in faot alibi witnesses. They added
nothing to the alibi defense (T. 146, 149, 152).
Evidence concerning a fight which had occurred on
the night of the robbery was introduced and allowed for
the purpose of showing only that a fight diid in fact take
place in Midvale after the robbery (T. 155). In fact, the
evidence was to estabiish merely that the defendant was in
Midvale (T. 156). The prosecution did not object to that
point (T. 150), but did in fact object to any endless detail
about the fight (T. 155). This objection was sustained (T.
156) . The defense counsel explained that he did not wish
to go into detail about the fight (T. 155).
The defendant testified that he was in Midvale on the
night of the robbery ( T. 166) .
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING THE APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUP-
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PRESS THE IN-COURT IDENTIFICATION OF
THE DEFENDANT; THE CONFRONTATIONS
BETWEEN THE APPELLANT AND STATE'S
WITNESSES DID NOT VIOLATE THE DUE
PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT NOR THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
OF THE FIFTH AND SIXTH AMENDMENTS.
The appellant states in his argument that his Fiflth
Amendment right<; were violated. He has not, however,
developed this argument in his brief. It deserves emphasis
that this case presents no question of the admissibmty in
evidence of anything Gilpin said or did whch implicates his
privilege. A Fifth Amendment violation is therefore not rin
question. United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218 (1967).
There are several approaches available to the Court,
and each one supports the position that the trial court did
not err in denying appellant's motion to suppress the incourt identification.
POINT IA.
LOOKING AT THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRC UM ST AN C ES SURROUNDING THE INCOURT IDENTIFICATIONS AND THE PRETRIAL VIEWINGS, IT IS CLEAR THAT APPELLANT WAS NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS
OF LAW BY THE ADMISSION OF THE INCOURT IDENTIFICATIONS.
Since both confrontations took place before custody
and before an information was filed, Wade, supra, and
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Gilbert V. Californm. 388 U. S. 263 (1967), do not apply.
This same approach was follo\Yecl by the Arizona Supreme
Court in State V. Fields, 104 Ariz. 486, 455 P. 2d 964
(1969) :
"Wade and Gilbert are inapplicable in this case
as they relate only to poot-information situations.
( Cita;tion omitted.) In the instant case no information has been filed and counsel had not yet been
appointed." Id. at 487, 455 P. 2d at 965.
The situation is the same in this case. Since Wade and
Gilbert do not apply, our determination of the issue is controHed by Stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293 ( 1967). The precise issue to be decided is whether, looking at the totality
of the circumstances ·Surrounding the in-court identification and pre-trfal confrontations, the appellant was denied
due process of law by admission of the State's witnesses'
identification at the trial. The trial court ruled in a motion
to suppress that the pre-tri.al confrontations did not violate
appellant's rights. This determination wa.s correct and the
judge did not err in so ruling.
Both Mrs. Mitchell and Miss Hom were afforded ample
opportunity for sustained observation of the appellant at
the time of the robbery. The appellant did not wear a mask
or disguise, or otherwise attempt to conceal his identity
from the victims. Mrs. Mitchell served coffee to the appellant (T. 90) and observed him while he sat in a booth (T.
90) . She observed him as he came around the cash register
and took out the money (T. 91). She watched him back out
the door and run towards the Centre Theater (T. 91-92) ·
There is nothing to suggest that the lighting was bad or
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that the angle at which Mrs. Mitchell viewed the appeHant
subjected him to any distortions.
Miss Hom also saw the appellant cleal'ly. She was at
the ca.sh register ·when appellant took out the money (T.
113). Both witnesses positively identified the appellant as
one of the men which robbed the Pancake House. This
identification, when looked at in light of the totality of the
circumstances surrounding it, did not violate due process
of law.
The appellant challenges two separate confrontations,
i.e., the confrontation between Mrs. Mitchell and appellant
in front of Dee's Drive-In on 33rd South and Highland
D1·ive, and the confrontation between Miss Hom and appellant in the courtroom of the Honorable Leonard W.
Elton, Judge, Third Di.strict Court. The respondent will
discuss these confrontations separately.
Mrs. ·Mitchell first saw the appellant on the night of
the robbery. She testified that she saw him clearly (T.
90-91}. About three weeks later she again saw the appellant in front of Dee's Drive-In on Highland Drive and 33rd
South. She was riding with a deputy sheriff whom she ha;d
e;;,:lled because she feared that her husband would harm her
(T. 92). The evidence is clear that she saw appellant first
and indicated to the deputy that he looked like one of the
men who had robbed her (T. 92, 107). The officer made
no suggestions to her before this time. There is nothing
whatsoever which indicates that the deputy and Mrs.
Mitchell went by Dee's ·with the pre-conceived idea of seeing one of the robbers. Mrs. Mitchell made the initial

tification completely on her own. 'rhe deputy suggested
nothing to her.
After Mrs. Mi:tchell .spotted the appeHan:t, the deputy
turned around to let her have a better look ( T. 92). He
caHed appellant to the car and talked with him throug'h the
front window. Mrs. Mitchell then
identified the
appellant as one of the men who had robbed the Pancake
House on September 27, 1968 (T. 92). This oonfroilltation
occurred on October 22, 1968. To suggest that before appellant could be identified in these circumsltances counsel
must be provided, is to stretch Wade and Gilbert totally
out of proportion siince they deailt only wi.th post--information 'lineups, where the police influence was highly suggestive. Neither fact was present in this first confrontation situation. The appellant's argument concerning this
first confronrtJartion is wilthout merit and suggests tha:t before a defendant can be identified in court, counsel should
have been wiith him throughout the entire robbery and at
any time thereafter, just in case one of the victims happens
to see him in the street.
Concerning the confrontation between Miss Hom and
the appellant, it is dear that no identification was made at
that time (T. 116). Miss Hom had gone to the police station to view a lineup and attempt to idenltify the taJller
robber. She was unable to make 1an identification (T. 115).
At the request of Detective Ledford, she went upstairs to
a courtroom to see if "anyone looked familiar" (T. 115) ·
She was there for two minutes and was unable to identify
the defendant 1who was in foot present (T. 116). Since no
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identification was made, no prejudice resuited to the appellant and this viewing did not violate due process of law.
Uni:ted States V. Scully, 415 F. 2d 680 (2d Oir. 1969), held
that where no posiitive identification was made of the defendant at the confrontation, then the in-court identification need not be excluded. Id. at 684.
Miss Hom testiffod that she did not make a positive
identification of the appellant untH he appeared at the
preliminary hearing (T. 117). In United States v. Black,
412 F. 2d 687 (6th Cir. 1969), the court, relying on Stovall,
held:
"In order Ito :taint an identification rtt must appear that .the viewing wa.s unnecessarily suggesibive
and conducive to irreparable mistaken idenrtific.ation." Id. at 690.
The identification in Black occurred at a preliminary
hearing where, like in appellant's situation, counsel was
present but had no notice that his cUent was being identlified. The viewing was in a state courtroom in which a
judge was presiddng. The defendant and his brother were
present with :their counsel. The witnesses were instructed
only to abserve the two defendants to determine whether
either of them looked like any of the photographs which
1Jhey had seen. Black was not pointed ou:t by :thJe F. B. I.
agents. Id. at 690. In the instant case, Miss Hom was
told to see if anyone looked familiar. She was not told that
Gilpin was the suspect. This procedure is not unnecessarily
suggestive, as the court in Black so held. This reasoning is
applicable fo both the viewing in Judge Elton's Court and
the viewing at the preliminary hearing. In either situation,
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the appellant's rights were not violated and the procedure
rwas not suggestive.
In Unit('d Staf('s v. Lipo1citz, 401 F. 2d 591 (3d Cir.
1968), the "·itnesses of a bank robbery were requested to
sit in a comtroom during the arraignment of a suspect,
" ... to determine if they could recognize any of the men
in the courfroom." Id. at 591. It was held that the procedure was not unnecessarily suggestive.
In United States v. Qual'les, 387 F. 2d 551 (4th Cir.
1967), the Court said:
"Martin had no right that he not be viewed.
United States V. Wade, 388 U. S. at 221. A lineup
is not the only means of identifying a suspect; an
individual not in custody, as Martin, 'may be placed
under surveilance he may be viewed on the
streets, entering or leaving his home or place of
bus1iness, at places of amusement, or at any other
place where he is not entitled to privacy.' " Id. at
556.
The appellant had no right that he not be viewed. In either
confrontation by Mrs. Mitchell or by Miss Hom, the appellant was viewed prior to information and prior to custody
f 01' the crime charged. The totality of the circumstances
show beyond a doubt that due process was not violated.
Simmons v. United States, 390 U. S. 377 ( 1968). The viewings were not so unnecessarily suggestive as to lead to an
irreparable mistaken identification.
POINT IB.
THE APPELLANT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT
RIGHT TO COUNSEL WAS NOT VIOLATED

BECAL'SE THE IN-COURT IDENTIFICATION
HAD AN INDEPENDENT SOURCE.
Even if TV ade and Gilbe1 t ai·e applicable to this case,
the Comt can affirm the trial comt's decision on the basis
that the in-comt ictentification had an independent source.
United States V. Wade, 388 U. S. 218, 2·12 ( 1967).
In Stntc v. V(lsquez, 22 Utah 2d 277, 451 P. 2d 786
(1969), the Utah Supreme Court held:
"The record before this court does permit an
independent judgment and discloses that Coxey's incourt identification had an independent source,
namely, Coxey"s description of the automobile and
its occupants and his identification of Vasquez and
the other four defendants shortly after the occurrence and during the course of their apprehension."
Id. at 279, 451 P. 2d at 787-788.
Even though the precise facts are different, the tiest to be
<epplied is the same, i.e., does the record permit an independent juctgment and disclose that Mrs. Mitchell's and
lVIiss Hom's in-court identifications had an independent
source? Respondent submits that it does.
Both witnesses made a positive identification of the
appellant in comt (T. 90; 113). On crnss-examination they
we1·e questioned thoroughly about the robbery, their statements to the deputy sheriff and Detective Ledord, and their
identifications (T. 109, 115). They both gave detailed desc1·iptions of the robber, his appearance, size, and clothing
(T. 91, 112-113). Considering their testimony and all the
facts and circumstances, it is clear that both ·witnesses
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would have recognized and identified Gilpin in court, even
if they had not preV1iously seen him at Dee's Hamburger
Drive-In and in Judge Elton's courtroom. This is true,
especially in light of the fact that Mis.s Hom did not even
make an identifrication in Judge E1ton's courtroom (T. 116).
Further, the record establishes that both witnesses had
excellent opportunities for sustained observation of appellant at the time of the crime. The appellant, as stated before, did not wear a mask or disguise or otherwise attempt
to conceal his identity from the victims. He was in the restaurant for at least an half-an-hour before the robbery (T.
94). They both waitched him go to the cash register and
take the money (T. 102, 114). In Williams v. United States,
409 F. 2d 471 (D. C. Cir. 1969), the court ruled that even:
" ... if we assume a defect (in the police station confrontation), we do not think a remand is
necessary here because the record before us provides
an independent source for the two 1in-court identifications of such a nature as to dispel any substantial likelihood of misidentification." Id. wt 473.
The record in Williams, like in this case, showed that the:
". . . two witnesses had excellent, not to say
unique in the one instance, opportunities for sustained observation at the time of the crime, and
each made firm and positive identifications of appellant at trial." Id.
This same test was applied in Wade, 388 U. S. at 242. Respondent submits that even if a defect is !assumed, the in·
court idenitifrioations did have independent sources and ap·
pellant's right to counsel under Wade and Gilbert was not
violated.
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POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO ALLOW THE DEFENSE TO PRESENT EVIDENCE RELATING TO APPELLANT'S PRESENCE IN MIDVALE AFTER
THE ROBB:filRY; SUCH REFUSAL DID NOT
DENY APPELLANT THE OPPORTUNITY TO
PRESENT HIS ALIBI.

The appeNant in making this argument is p:roc€eding
under a fal.ge premise, to wit: that the Midvale incident
"would have tied together the testimony of the witnesses
for the defendant and corroborated his alibi." (Appellant's
Brief, p. 16.) The conclusion drawn from tbhis premise is
equally faulty : "not on'1y could such evidence aid to esta!blish his whereabouts but would also render his becoming
involved in a fiight likely improbable if he had just committed a robbery." (Appellant's Brief, p. 18.) Thi8 conclusion is drawn without any supporting evidence, and
when viewed in light of the fact that the robbery occurred
in downtown Salt Lake between 9 :00 and 9 :30 p.m. (T.
90, 91) and the fight took place at about 11 :00 p.m. in
Midvale, (T. 160, 168), it could be very probable that the
appellant was involved in both.
The
can hardly claim prejudice and reversible error when the record clearly shows that the fight in
Midvale did get before the jury. The defense counsel stated
that he wanted the ev,idence ,to show "that the event of a
fight did
place and
substantiate that Mr. Gilpin
was present," (T. 154, 15'5), and "merely, for the point of
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showing to the j m·y he1·e was an event tha:t was not fabricated by any per-son and which was a legitimate point of
reference" (T. 155). The Judge then said:
THE COURT: So far as the point referred t,1
is concerned, that fa already in. Wha:t Ledford sai(i
[investigation showed that Gilpin \>'as involved in a
fight in Midvale] would permit you to argt;e about
it. Now, if it is a matter of prejudice, and I let you
go into it, I don't know where it is going to end. I
don't know how far the State, then, will want to go
on cross-examination to show that he was one of
the participants in a brawl, or an incipient riot_
I don't know where it was; that he was one of the
rtoters - one of the brawlers; I don't knov\' ho1Y
far they are going to go, and I don't know - if you
go into it, I can't -s.top it for cross examination.
MR. BARNEY: [agreeing j I would think, your
Honor, that the less sa:id about that, be the less
prejudicial to the defendant.
THE COURT: That was one thing I was cautious about. If you don't think it is going to hurt
your defendant, I think I ·will let you go ahead.
MR. BARNEY:

Well, the mere -

the ow

thing that we desire to do, ma:inly, ·was to sh(n-,· fa1c

this - that such event in Midvale on this evening
did, in fact, take place; and the matte1· is 8 matter
of 1·ecord" (T. 155). (Emphasis added.)
Mr. Thedrick, the prosecuting attorney, then responded by
saying that no details should be admitted in evidence (T.
156). The Com't again agreed (T. 156) and Mr. Barney
said:
MR. BARNEY: No; we don't want to try the
merits of the brawl; want to establish, merely, that
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there is a problem there, existing; substantial evidence to show tJhat the defendant in fact did appear
'in Mi,dvale.
THE COURT: All rig•ht; you have had, at
lea;st - you have had, at least, three persons testify
to that haven't you?
MR. BARNEY : That is correct.
THE COURT: Ledford Baid he was there.
MR. BARNEY: Mr. Ledford said 156) . (Emphasis added.)

yes (T.

Martin Joseph Martinez testifiied thrut a fight took
place (T. 152). Dennis Montoya also testified that a fight
took place (T. 147). Mr. Fredrick objected to any further
testimony on tJhe fight, and the objection was sustained
(T. 147). This is the very thing the defense counsel agreed
to in Chambers, Le.; no details ahout the fight (T. 154,
155).
In Vaughn v. State, 19 N. E. 2d 239 (Ind. 1939), the
court ruled that the Bole test in determining whether evidence is admissible to prove or disprove aliibi is whether
the evidence of.f ered tends to prove facts sought to be estab1ished. Id. at 242. The evidence in tJhis case, i.e., details
about the fight, would not tend to prove the alibi defenBe.
In Wisdom v. People, 11 Colo. 170, 17 Pac. 519 ( 1887), the
court admitted testimony that on the evening of the crime
the defendant was at a pawnbroker's office. They refuBed,
however, to allow testimony that he borrowed money at
that time, because such evidence was immaterial. 'I'he
same rationale controls the present fact situa:tion. Appellant should not be able to testify that he was involved in a
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fight even though testimony that he was m Midvale is
properly admissible.
The appellant claims that the error occurred when he
took the stand to testify. He was asked why he went to
Midvale ( T. 166) . The district a:ttorney objected to the
question as being immaterial, and the Court sustained the
objection (T. 166). In order to answer the question "And
why were you going to Midvale?" (T. 166) (Emphasis
added), the defendant would have had to go into the details about the fight; the very thing defense
said
he did not want to do. There was no evidence presented
to indicate that defendant went to Midvale for the specific
purpose of
He could have gone for other reasons
and ended up in a brawl. The objecmon was properly sustained to the form of 1Jhe question asked and tJhe 'resulting
details which could not have been avoided by answering the
question the way it was asked. Defense counsel made no
effort to re-phrase the question.
Further, the district attorney asked the defendant if
the boys who had previously testified were with him after
10 :30 on the night of the robbery. 'Dhe defendant answered
yes (T. 170). The boys' testimony concerning the f,ight was
already in (T. 147-1'52). The fact that the appellant went
to Midvale was in evidence (T. 166). And the fact that
defendant went with the boys was in evidence (T. 170).
The jury could make the connections, and appeNant cannot
claim prejudicial error in light of these facts, especially
since defense counsel agreed that no details be admitted.
'Dhe very points he wanted before the jury were in evidence.
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Respondent .submits that this eX!amination of the record
shows clearly that no error was committed and appellant
suffered no prejudice.

CONCLUSION
Respondent asks this Court to affirm the decision by
the trial court and hold that the court committed no error
in denying appeUant's motion to suppress the in-court
identifications and in refusing to allow detailed evidence of
an event which occurred at least one and a half hours after
the robbery.
Resl)'ectfully submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
LAUREN N. BEASLEY
Chief Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

